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International human rights advocacy has traditionally been defined by the claims of 
persecuted individuals or groups against states.  The post-WWII recognition of 
individuals as legal rights-bearers in the international arena ushered in an era of 
human rights institution-building to address the grievances of affected persons.  In 
a typical case, an individual or group deprived of rights sues the state in a forum 
designed to hear such claims, a classic vertical and unidirectional demand.  The state 
is always the defendant or respondent and although many institutions are highly 
deferential toward the state’s sovereign prerogatives, the model invites injured 
claimants or petitioners to seek equitable redress, compensation or declaratory relief 
in a sphere beyond the control of the state in question.  From the European Court of 
Human Rights to the Inter-American Commission and Court of Human Rights to 
the Human Rights Committee of the ICCPR to the many treaty bodies of the United 
Nations, states stand accused of violations in a legalistic web of courts, institutions 
and quasi-investigative bodies.1  The institutions designed to uphold international 
human rights are founded on the dual premise that the state owes legal duties to 
human beings and that a breach of specified rights guarantees may be remedied in 
a forum that acknowledges the responsibilities of the collective toward a person or 
persons. 
 
There are myriad problems with a global system that pits individuals against 
disinterested states: many systems, including the Inter-American Human Rights 
                                                        
1 Romania alone has been sued in 14,000 cases at the European Court of Human Rights by Roma (gypsy) 




Commission have grown sclerotic, a process that causes prejudicial delays to 
applicants;2 underenforcement of judgments and the failure to monitor 
implementation routinely betray the promise of justice and the cost and expertise 
required to effectively navigate many international bodies deters many worthy 
claimants.3  Sovereignty, as William Nifong notes, can be deployed as a shield 
“most often invoked by countries and leaders seeking to avoid the scrutiny, 
condemnation, and possible intervention of the international community.”4  
Excessive deference to states, it is clear, frustrates many of the core principles of 
human rights promotion.5   
 
But equally challenging is the fact that states aren’t necessarily the worst 
wrongdoers.  In a world where corporations negotiate with elected and unelected 
leaders to remove national labor regulations, where military contractors enjoy 
impunity for abuses committed in conflict zones, and where firms use proxies in 
government to do their bidding even where public health and human security are 
compromised, states are no longer the sole agents of human rights abuses..  
Corporations, designed to deliver returns to shareholders, can trammel fundamental 
                                                        
2 Instituto de Defensa Legal (IDL), Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales (CELS), Due Process of Law 
Foundation (DPLF), Centro de Estudios de Derecho, Justicia y Sociedad (Dejusticia), & Conectas Direitos 
Humanos, Fundación Construir, Position of Civil Society Organizations of the Americas on the Final 
Report of the Special Working Group to Reflect on the Workings of the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights with a View to Strengthening the Inter-American Human Rights System, 16 APORTES DPLF 
(2012), avaliable at http://www.dplf.org/uploads/1338572412.pdf, at 51. 
3 See Charles R. Venator-Santiago, The Changing Face of Justice: Access to the Inter-American System of 
Human Rights, 3 CREIGHTON INT’L & COMP. L.J. 116, 116 (2012); Rachel Slater, Gender Violence or 
Violence against Women? The Treatment of Forced Marriage in the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 13 
MELBOURNE J. OF INT’L LAW 732, 773 (2012) (in the context of forced marriage as a gender crime, 
describing the similarities of obligations of state and non-state actors); Laura M. Olson, Practical 
Challenges of Implementing the Complementarity between International Humanitarian and Human Rights 
Law - Demonstrated by the Procedural Regulation of Internment in Non-international Armed Conflict, 40 
CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 437, 450 (2009) (describing the assumption that “private individuals or groups, 
i.e., non-state actors, do not have the legal capacity to violate IHL”). 
4 William R. Nifong, Promises Past: Marcus Atilus Regulus and the Dialogue of Natural Law, 49 DUKE 
L.J. 1077, 1124 (2000). 
5 Peter R. Baehr, BOOK REVIEW AND NOTE: Review Essays: Human Rights at the Millennium: Human 




liberties just as state actors do.6  At oral argument before the United States Supreme 
Court, Justice Breyer recently mused that it would be appropriate to refer to modern 
day human rights abusers as “Torture, Inc..”7  Justice Breyer’s observation is 
matched by the work of scholars who have recognized that an exclusively state-
centric approach leaves trans-state actors, such as multinational corporations, 
without accountability.8 
 
Traditionally, business entities (like individuals) had no standing in international 
law and were thus rendered invisible on world stage.9  As long as such entities 
remained primarily within one state, i.e. were incorporated, headquartered and 
active there, they had a clear home and it was the home state that had the right to 
represent them on the international stage.  After World War II, however, three major 
developments changed the picture: business entities became more international so 
that their “home” often became less clear; they acquired their own rights under 
certain treaties so that they became less dependent on state protection in the 
individual case;10 and today the forces of globalization mean that corporate 
misconduct can be exposed and transmitted in real time.11 
 
                                                        
6 Corporations are not the only non-state actors to gain legal subjectivity in recent years: individuals 
(particularly persons accused of international humanitarian law violations), international organizations and 
some non-state groups, including al-Qaeda, are increasingly the focus of human rights claims. 
7 Oral Argument at 50: 8, 14, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 2013 U.S. LEXIS 
3159 (U.S. 2013). 
8 Miriam Mafessanti, Corporate Misbehavior and International Law: Are There Alternatives to 
“Complicity?” 6 S.C. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 167, 180-181 (2010). 
9 Zakia Afrin, Foreign Direct Investments and Sustainable Development in the Least-Developed Countries, 
10 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 215, 229 (2004). 
10 Emeka Duruigbo, Corporate Accountability and Liability for International Human Rights Abuses: 
Recent Changes and Recurring Challenges, 6 NW. U. J. INT'L HUM. RTS. 222, 239 (2008) (citing Elihu 
Lauterpacht, International Law and Private Foreign Investment, 4 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 259, 274 
(1997), for the proposition that, due to dispute settlement mechanisms and other arbitration provisions in 
investment treaties, corporations possess “international legal personality”). 
11 See, e.g., Della Kilroy, Seeing Is Believing: Human Rights Content in the Age of Social Media, 





Aware of these trends, a new generation of human rights advocates is using 
innovative tools to vindicate rights, shame corporate abusers, and fashion new forms 
of relief.   Although institutional changes have been slow to emerge, the field of 
international human rights law is increasingly shaped by non-state actors bringing 
claims against other non-state entities, principally corporations.12  This paper 
explores examples of horizontal (and occasionally diagonal) advocacy that reframe 
the role of the state and the purpose of human rights promotion.  By examining the 
growing trend of direct suits against corporations for human rights abuses, 
environmental action at the local and supranational level, and the struggle by AIDS 
activists to win compulsory licenses for HIV medications in Colombia – the state as 
forum, partner and enforcer – I ask whether we are witnessing a paradigm shift in 
the field of human rights and a new role for the state as a facilitator of accountability 
and a partner in fulfilling human rights guarantees. 
 
i)  The State as Forum and Facilitator 
 
Global actors concerned about human rights have long scrutinized the activities of 
business enterprises, in particular multinational corporations (MNCs).13 Some 
international organizations and NGOs have made it their business to expose the 
various kinds of corporate activity that have a detrimental impact on human welfare.  
In the main, these groups do not critique capitalism or corporate economic power 
writ large, but they do criticize certain corporate behavior for impinging on clearly 
accepted norms of human rights law based on widely ratified treaties and customary 
                                                        
12 See ALAN BOYLE AND CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Oxford University 
Press, 2007) 89 (listing examples of soft law instruments promulgated by non-state actors). 
13 The most definitive works on MNCs and human rights include David Kinley, ed., HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
CORPORATIONS (2009); Claudia T. Salazar, Applying International Human Rights Norms in the United 
States: Holding Multinational Corporations Accountable in the United States For International Human 
Rights Violations Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 19 J. CIV. RIGHTS & ECON. DEV. 111 (2004); Edith 
Brown Weiss, Invoking State Responsibility in the Twenty-First Century, 96 AM J. INT’L L. 798, 798 
(2002); Beth Stephens, The Amorality of Profit: Transnational Corporations and Human Rights, 20 
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 45, 75 (2002). Stephens points out that traditional international law prohibited piracy 




international law.14  Beginning in the 1990s, several human rights organizations 
developed a methodology for evaluating the actions of MNCs using the language 
and standards of international human rights.15 Human rights lawyers began to look 
for ways to translate criticism into legal action.  In that effort, advocates have sought 
to use existing available means to correct the rights abuses of corporations and to 
invent new tools of accountability, from drafting codes of conduct to soft law 
encouragement, to promoting as yet unadopted international treaties.  The problem 
with each of these methods is the inability to attach true legal obligations to 
corporate malfeasance.16  Even egregious conduct, such as the decision to reopen 
the Bangladesh factory that collapsed in April 2013,17 is not deterred by industry-
driven self-regulation.  And unlike the space provided by national or sub-national 
human rights commissions or statutes affording damages against state actors (to the 
extent the perpetrators are not shielded by immunity) there is no obvious forum in 
which to remedy human rights violations committed by business entities. 
 
As a consequence, human rights activists are turning to public and private law 
causes of action capable of generating monetary damages.  In the same way that a 
web of statutes, regulations and policy directives control corporate environmental, 
anticompetitive, securities or bribery-related activities, firms can be held to human 
rights standards.  And although private litigation might be a cumbersome way to 
enforce such duties, human rights claims presented before tribunals familiar to 
business defendants offer a realistic opportunity to sanction corporations.  
 
Corporate law recognizes liability for a host of torts which produce remedies in 
economic terms that firms well understand.  Tort laws are almost universal; 
                                                        
14 Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Right: A Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443 
(2001). 
15 See, e.g. Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, www.business-humanrights.org/Home.   
16 To be sure, that reputational costs of human rights violations are real.  





according to the International Commission of Jurists “[i]n every jurisdiction, despite 
differences in terminology and approach, an actor may be held liable under the law 
of civil remedies if through negligent or intentional conduct it causes harm to 
someone else.”18 Assuming a fair and impartial adjudicator, remedies for harm to 
life and liberty are part of public and private litigation around the world.  To the 
extent a foreign country does not have effective tort laws, then a choice of law public 
policy exception may result in the application of domestic tort laws.  
 
At the risk of emphasizing relatively minor legal failings – prosecuting corporate 
Capones for tax evasion if you will – advocates seeking to call business entities to 
reckon for human rights violations are finding that facially neutral tribunals can be 
a platform for redress.  From this perspective, the state facilitates horizontal legal 
action between two non-state entities and provides a forum amenable to – if not 
designed for – the resolution of human rights questions. 
 
Hazel Tau et al v. GlaxoSmith Kline, Boehringer Ingelheim et al,19 demonstrates the 
efficacy of direct action by one non-state actor against another in the context of an 
antitrust suit before South Africa’s National Competition Commission.  There, the 
complainants, working with the Treatment Action Campaign, alleged that the firms 
had breached Article 8(a) of the Competition Act 1998 (South Africa) by charging 
excessive prices for anti-retroviral medicines (ARVs) to the detriment of consumers.  
The complainants charged that ‘The excessive pricing of anti-retrovirals is directly 
responsible for premature, predictable and avoidable deaths of people living with 
HIV/AIDS, including both children and adults.’20  The Competition Commission 
                                                        
18 www.icjcanada.org/fr/document/doc_2008-10_vol3.pdf 






found for the complainants, although it allowed the defendants to amortize 
development costs.21 
 
Likewise, in April 2006, the on-going legal drama concerning Texaco/Chevron’s 
activities in Ecuador took on a new twist when Cristobal Bonifaz filed a second 
class action lawsuit against Chevron, Doe v. Texaco, with nine named plaintiffs, 
who suffer from cancer or an increased risk of cancer that they attribute to pollution 
from Texaco’s produced water waste in Ecuador.  The complaint was based on 
claims of unjust enrichment and violations of California’s Unfair Competition Law; 
the suit asks for disgorgement of the unlawful profits to build medical facilities in 
the impacted region where the plaintiffs live.  The court dismissed the complaint for 
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted but allowed the plaintiffs 
to amend and refile.  The amended complaint also arises out of injuries related to 
cancer and increased risk of cancer, but is not a class action and is based on common 
law claims of negligence, intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress, and 
battery; it seeks equitable relief in the form of a medical monitoring trust fund to 
establish medical facilities in the affected region, or compensatory and punitive 
damages.22 
 
Perhaps the most well known forum for the litigation of human rights violations 
committed by corporations is the Alien Tort Claims Act.  Although the Supreme 
Court has recently been diminished the scope of the statute, the ATCA stands as a 
                                                        
21 The Commission’s decision promoted a settlement between the parties under which GlaxoSmithKline 
and Boehringer Ingelheim agreed to grant voluntary licenses on their patented medicines to generic firms in 
exchange for a royalty.  The AIDS Law Project, acting on behalf of the Treatment Action Campaign, 
recently filed another complaint with the South African Competition Commission to investigate the refusal 
by Merck and its South African subsidiary to allow sufficient competition to lower the price of Efavirenz. 
Similar claims against corporations under domestic law and the use of national patent flexibilities (such as 
India’s opportunity for pre-grant opposition to patent applications or Canada’s generic medicines export 
license procedures) offer additional avenues for increasing access to medicines. 
22 Judith Kimerling, Transnational Operations, Bi-National Injustice: ChevronTexaco and Indigenous 





model for the reappropriation of legal avenues originally constructed to deal with 
non-human rights issues.  Under the act, foreigners alleging a tort in violation of the 
law of nations may bring suit in U.S. federal court.  The watershed case of Doe v. 
Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002) embodied the use of the statute as well 
as other state and federal laws (such as the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq.) to vindicate human rights claims.  In 
Unocal, Burmese villagers alleged that the company directly or indirectly subjected 
the plaintiffs to forced labor, murder, rape, and torture when the defendants 
constructed a gas pipeline through the Tenasserim region.  By finding the defendant 
potentially liable, Unocal clarified the theory of corporate aiding and abetting of 
atrocities and emboldened dozens of other suits, including In re South African 
Apartheid Litigation, 346 F. Supp. 2d 538 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Sarai v. Rio Tinto, 550 
F.3d 822 (9th Cir. 2008); and Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, 
Inc., 582 F.3d 244 (C.A. 2, 2009).  Thus, for nearly a decade after Unocal, U.S. 
courts proceeded on the assumption that the Alien Tort Statute can provide 
jurisdiction over corporations.   
 
In Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), however, the 
Second Circuit held that corporations could not be liable for human rights abuses 
under customary international law so that there was no subject-matter jurisdiction 
under the ATCA.  On appeal to the Supreme Court, a majority reasoned that the 
presumption against extraterritoriality applies to claims under the alien tort statute, 
and found that nothing in the statute rebuts that presumption.23  Justice Breyer’s 
concurrence agreed with the majority’s dismissal of the case, but argued that the 
ATS should provide “jurisdiction . . . where (1) the alleged tort occurs on American 
soil, (2) the defendant is an American national, or (3) the defendant's conduct 
substantially and adversely affects an important American national interest, and that 
                                                        




includes a distinct interest in preventing the United States from becoming a safe 
harbor (free of civil as well as criminal liability) for a torturer or other common 
enemy of mankind.”24  Justice Kennedy wrote in his one-paragraph concurrence that 
“[t]he opinion for the Court is careful to leave open a number of significant 
questions regarding the reach and interpretation of the Alien Tort Statute.  In my 
view that is a proper disposition.”25  Justice Alito with Justice Thomas joining found 
that “a putative ATS cause of action will fall within the scope of the presumption 
against extraterritoriality – and will therefore be barred – unless the domestic 
conduct is sufficient to violate an international norm that satisfies Sosa's 
requirements of definiteness and acceptance among civilized nations.”26  Kiobel 
leaves undecided the issue of corporate liability itself and does not preclude non-
state actors from suing corporations in other contexts.27 Kiobel also appears to create 
more stringent standards for U.S. corporations than their foreign counterparts 
(because of the territorial nexus to the firm).  A case against ExxonMobil in 
Indonesia, for example, may go forward because ExxonMobil “sprung from 
Standard Oil and is currently headquartered in Texas.”28 
 
Even if ATCA litigation has been severely curtailed, the practice of looking to 
domestic legal fora to resolve human rights claims endures.  One possible outcome 
could be renewed interest in transnational tort litigation.  When human rights claims 
are framed as intentional torts, torture is recast as assault and battery and slavery 
becomes a false imprisonment.  Instead of searching for a statute that condemns 
                                                        
24 Id. at 31 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
25 Id. at 26 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
26 Id. at 29 (Alito, J., concurring). 
27 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum: Beyond the Alien Tort Statute—Broadly Extending the Presumption 
Against the Extraterritorial Reach of US Law, JD SUPRA (Apr. 26, 2013) (Lexis-Nexis, News, Most Recent 
90 Days); Supreme Court Leaves Much Unclear In Opinion on Alien Tort Statute, INSIDE U.S. TRADE (Apr. 
26, 2013) (Lexis-Nexis, News, Most Recent 90 Days). 
28 Indonesians Sue ExxonMobil in US court; Villagers in Aceh Claim ExxonMobil is Responsible for 
Human Rights Abuses Committed by Indonesian Soldiers Guarding its Natural Gas Pipeline and 
Processing Facility, GLOBALPOST: BEATS (NORTH AMERICA) (Apr. 26, 2013) (Lexis-Nexis, News, Most 




corporate accessorial liability for war crimes, genocide or crimes against humanity, 
a tort-focused approach views the case as the product of reckless or negligent 
behavior where what matters is whether the defendant knew or should have known 
that its conduct would cause harm.  To do so, advocates for corporate accountability 
are well advised to become experts in choice of law and comparative tort law, advice 
illustrated by Roger Alford’s laundry list of choice-of-law issues:   
 
Going forward, human rights lawyers must consider whether choice-of-
law standards of the several states will authorize recourse to state or 
foreign tort laws. That means forum shopping with an eye toward 
choice of law. Is it better to sue in a “most significant relationship” 
jurisdiction (e.g., Texas, Florida), a “government interest” jurisdiction 
(e.g., District of Columbia, California), a lex fori jurisdiction (e.g., 
Michigan, Kentucky), a lex loci delicti jurisdiction (e.g., Virginia, 
Maryland), a “better law” jurisdiction (e.g., Minnesota, New 
Hampshire), or a jurisdiction that adopts an eclectic approach (e.g., New 
York, Pennsylvania). Who knows, for it will depend on the facts of each 
case. In some cases (i.e., terrorist attacks in Israel), foreign tort laws 
may be preferable to state tort laws. In other cases (i.e., torture and 
killings in Burma), domestic tort laws will be far preferable to foreign 
laws.29  
 
Consciously or not, states can invite human rights litigation through tested, non-
specific means.  It then falls to advocates to repurpose existing frameworks while 
preserving their viability as adjudicatory bodies for a range of functions.   
 
ii)  The State as Partner 
 
States have long been beholden to business interests.  In some contexts, including 
the negotiation of trade treaties, the demands of the corporate community are 
elevated to doctrine.  Indeed, the enduring symbol of the Cochabamba water 
controversy, the spark that generated a social movement backlash, was the image of 
                                                        
29 Roger Alford, http://opiniojuris.org/2013/04/17/kiobel-instthe-death-of-the-ats-and-the-rise-of-




the former President of Bolivia and mayor of the town drinking champagne with 
Bechtel executives at a contract-signing ceremony that would privatize water 
rendering it unaffordable to much of the local populace.30 
 
But the opposite is also true: states can lend governmental resources to support 
human rights ideals.  Strategic partnerships between state officials and the human 
rights community may prove to be mutually beneficial and serve to deflect criticism 
away from the state toward corporate wrongdoers that may bear more immediate 
responsibility.  Nowhere is the process more pronounced than in the field of 
environmental justice.  Throughout Latin America, the environment has become 
both a vehicle and an objective of contentious politics, influencing the way in which 
that politics is organized and performed and permitting shared interests between the 
state and one-time outsiders.  Anthony Bebbington observes that “new socio-
environmental movement organizations have emerged; new (if difficult) 
intersections between environmentalism and other discourses have been crafted; 
relationships among environmentalists have been built within the region as well as 
with groups beyond Latin America; new mega-conservation nongovernmental 
organizations have emerged; and so on.”31 
 
Consider Aguinda v. Chevron, the case that pits Ecuadorians from the Oriente region 
against Chevron, the successor in interest to Texaco.  Since the early 1960s, 
Texaco/Chevron has extracted oil from the eastern lowlands of the Oriente at a 
heavy environmental and human cost.32  In 1993, a class of Ecuadorian plaintiffs 
                                                        
30 William Finnegan, Leasing the Rain, THE NEW YORKER (Apr. 8, 2002), 
http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2002/04/08/020408fa_FACT1; see also, Leire Urkidi  & Mariana 
Walter, Dimensions of Environmental Justice in Anti-Gold Mining Movements in Latin America, 42 
GEOFORUM 683 (2011)(describing the confluence of corporate and local government interests in the face of 
anti-mining movements) 
31 Anthony Bebbington, Contesting Environmental Transformation: Political Ecologies and 
Environmentalisms in Latin America and the Caribbean, 44 LATIN AMERICAN RESEARCH REVIEW 177, 179 
(2009). 
32 See Suraj Patel, Delayed Justice: A Case Study of Texaco and the Republic of Ecuador’s Operations, 




sued Texaco in New York alleging massive environmental contamination that had 
caused elevated rates of cancer and birth defects.  The case was dismissed on forum 
non conveniens grounds and refiled in Ecuador.  After President Rafael Correa came 
to power, the case accelerated in the Ecuadorian courts, ultimately resulting in an 
$18 billion judgment (a figure that has subsequently grown to $27 billion).  The 
plaintiffs have attempted to enforce the Ecuadorian judgment in the U.S. where they 
have met fierce opposition from Chevron. 
 
The effort to collect on the judgment and redistribute Chevron’s profits to the 
affected communities has joined the state and the plaintiffs’ counsel in common 
cause.  According to Chevron, President Correa has exerted pressure on the judges 
and investigators to the detriment of the company’s interests.  Chevron also accuses 
Correa of conducting a visit to the former concession area in order “verify the 
environmental, social, and cultural impacts caused by hydrocarbon exploitation, in 
particular that of the U.S. company Texaco,” referring to the plaintiffs' counsel as 
“compañeros,” offering the government's support to the plaintiffs, pledging to assist 
in evidence gathering and calling upon Ecuador's Prosecutor General to indict 
persons involved in the Remediation Agreement and Final Act.  In the swirl of 
Correa’s anti-Chevron rhetoric, the company has concluded that “the thumbs of 
politics are weighing heavily on the scales of justice.”33 
 
                                                        
the chief sources of environmental damage were leaching or discharge of “formation water” and “produced 
water,” drilling wastes, accidental discharge from the pipeline, and deliberate dumping of wastes); Lucien 
J. Dhooge, Aguinda v. ChevronTexaco: Mandatory Grounds for the Non-Recognition of Foreign 
Judgments for Environmental Injury in the United States, 19 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 1, 7 (2009) (noting 
contaminated water and livestock, decreased life expectancy, and a rate of cancer three times higher in the 
Oriente than in other Amazon provinces); Judith Kimerling, Transnational Operations, Bi-National 
Injustice: ChevronTexaco and Indigenous Huaorani and Kichwa in the Amazon Rainforest in Equador, 31 
AM. INDIAN L. REV. 445, 451 (2006/2007) (noting that Texaco and other companies ignored Equadorian 
environmental laws and that the government failed to implement and enforce such laws). 
33 Juan Forero, In Ecuador, High Stakes in Case Against Chevron, Wash. Post, Apr. 28, 2009, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/04/27/AR2009042703717.html (quoting 




Whether or not Correa’s actions are benign, it is undisputed that post-judgment 
support from the state has galvanized the plaintiffs, carried the struggle into new 
arenas and increased the pressure on the defendant to offer meaningful redress.  
Much the same was true in Argentine Matanza/Riachuelo river case.34  In Mendoza 
Beatriz Silva et al. v. State of Argentina, residents of the Matanza/Riachuelo area 
filed suit arguing they had suffered damages owing to the pollution of the river.  In 
July 2008, the Court issued a decision in which it required the national government, 
the Province of Buenos Aires, and the City of Buenos Aires to take measures to 
improve the residents’ quality of life, remedy the environmental damage and 
prevent future contamination.  The Court established an action plan requiring the 
government agency responsible for the Matanza/Riachuelo basin, ACUMAR, to 
fulfill specific measures, including: a) producing and disseminating public 
information; b) controlling industrial pollution; c) cleaning up waste dumps; d) 
expanding water supply, sewer and drainage works; e) developing an emergency 
sanitation plan; f) adopting an international measurement system to assess 
compliance with the plans goals.  In order to ensure adequate enforcement, the Court 
delegated the enforcement process to a federal court, Juzgado Federal de Primera 
Instancia de Quilmes, to monitor enforcement of the decision.  
 
Following the ruling, the government tasked the national Ombudsman with 
participating in a working group comprised of diverse stakeholders, including 
NGOs that had been involved in the case as non-litigant parties.  The goal of the 
working group is to strengthen and enable citizen participation in monitoring 
enforcement of the decision.35  Although progress has been slow, the state has 
relocated some poor residents to government housing, identified and remediated 
open waste dumps and begun the sanitation process of river to help clean and re-
                                                        
34 See http://www.escr-net.org/sites/default/files/Sentencia_CSJN_2008_english.pdf 
35 See generally, Elynn Kaan, A Case of Environmental Justice: The Matanza-Riachuelo River Basin, 





oxidize the water, all as part of the Court-ordered mandate to implement social and 
economic rights in the aftermath of environmental degradation. 
 
Similarly, environmental activists in the United States pressured the Obama 
administration into delaying and re-routing the proposed Keystone Pipeline.36   The 
project was initially designed to transport crude oil from Alberta, Canada, across 
several U.S. states, and ultimately to Houston, Texas.37  Despite the State 
Department’s 2010 conclusion that the pipeline would have minimal environmental 
impact, environmental activists responded with a multi-faceted campaign to oppose 
the project and the production of oil produced from tar sands more generally.38  
 
The principal objective of the anti-pipeline campaign is to persuade the President to 
halt the project.  To achieve this goal, the campaign has adopted an insider/outsider 
strategy.  The insider tactic is to collaborate with the Environmental Protection 
Agency to oppose other federal agencies working to clear the sale of tar sands oil.39   
The external movement has engineered mass protests aimed at reminding the 
President that he was elected by a constituency with demands.40  The demonstrations 
have been led by Hollywood celebrities and members of Congress rather than anti-
systemic agitators.41 Movement figurehead Bill McKibben said at the Los Angeles 
protests in February 2013, “You cannot occupy the White House, but you can 
surround it,” a swipe against the Occupy Wall Street movement of 2011-12, viewed 
by mainstream activists as too extreme.42  Online petitions urge readers to “tell the 
                                                        
36 Courtney Cherry, The Keystone Pipeline: Environmentally Just?, 6 ENVT’L & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 
125, 126 (2011). 
37 Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., The Role of NEPA in Fossil Fuel Resource Development and Use in the Western 
United States, 39 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 283, 343. (2012). 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 344. 
40 See L.A. Protesters Join Campaign Against Keystone on Pipeline, LOS ANGELES TIMES (Feb. 17, 2013), 
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2013/02/la-protesters-join-nationwide-campaign-against-canadian-
oil-pipeline.html (documenting protesters in Los Angeles staging a demonstration “designed to pressure 






White House to cancel” the pipeline.43  President Obama responded to this social 
movement pressure by postponing a decision and issuing a memorandum in March 
2012 designed to facilitate review of the XL portion of the Keystone project, a 
course of conduct that comes at the expense of Canadian energy firms.44  
 
In all three instances, the alliance of government institutions and the demands of 
nongovernmental actors have transformed protest movements into governance 
partners.45  It is here that the state simultaneously validates human rights initiatives 
and wrests a measure of control from the original agitators.  Partnerships of this 
kind, usually limited in scope and duration, may constitute goal-oriented marriages 
of convenience.  In Ecuador, for example, environmentalists and indigenous people 
(represented by CONAIE) are wary of President Correa’s motivations, not 
withstanding his revolutionary rhetoric, and worry that the current regime will 
continue to allow mining and petroleum companies to gain unfettered access to 
traditional territories.  Correa, for his part, has been pleased to inveigh against a 
deep-pocketed foreign business while remaining mute on the environmental and 
monetary responsibilities of the Ecuadorian subsidiary.   
 
To be sure, the risk of cooption for social movements engaged in such partnerships 
is real.  As Jordi Díez chronicles, the assimilation of Mexican environmentalists into 
the Zedillo and Fox administrations weakened the environmental movement in that 
country.46 Paradoxically, by accepting jobs with the state, fellow Mexican 
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environmentalists outside of government found it exceedingly difficult “to apply 
pressure on the new government once it became evident that environmental issues 
did not figure high among the administration's priorities.”47 Still, representation at 
the highest levels of governments has provided many environmental groups with a 
seat at the table previously reserved for business.  The voice of environmentalists 
within the White House has meant that even if President Obama ultimately approves 
the pipeline, concerned groups expect climate change policy concessions – power 
plant regulations or renewable energy incentives – to offset the effects of carbon 
emissions associated with the project.48  
 
iii) The State as Enforcer 
 
What does it mean to employ the power of the state in the service of human rights 
and against corporate interests?  Can human rights be more effectively championed 
through, rather than against, the state?  In its approach to access to medicines, 
Colombia offers a potential answer. 
 
Like several other Latin American states, Colombia has promoted the enforcement 
of some (but not other) human rights guarantees.49  Spurred on by an energetic 
essential medicines campaign and periodic judicial rulings, the government of 
Colombia has consistently sided with human rights advocates seeking to lower the 
cost of life-saving anti-retroviral medicines used to combat HIV/AIDS.50  Beginning 
in 1994, the Constitutional Court of Colombia held that the state is required to 
provide HIV-positive persons with AIDS treatment regardless of cost.  In Pedro 
                                                        
47 Id. at 94. 
48 John M. Broder, Foes Suggest a Tradeoff if Pipeline Is Approved, NY TIMES (May 8, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/09/business/energy-environment/a-call-for-quid-pro-quo-on-keystone-
pipeline-approval.html?_r=0. 
49 See João Biehl, Will to Live: AIDS Therapies and the Politics of Survival (2007), which argues that 
Brazil’s AIDS policy is emblematic of novel forms of state action on and toward public health. 




Orlando Ubaque v. Director,51 the Court ordered ARVs for inmates unable to 
provide for their own healthcare.52  Active lobbying by civil society groups led to 
the subsequent addition of ARVs to the official medicines list.53  The government 
has since used a variety of mechanisms to promote price-reductions, including 
parallel imports, the issuance of compulsory licenses to promote generic 
competition and threats of additional action designed to compel brand 
pharmaceutical firms to provide voluntary licenses. 
 
In April 2009, the Colombian government issued an order establishing a price 
ceiling for Kaletra, an ARV medication produced by Illinois-based Abbott 
Pharmaceuticals.54  Abbott ignored the pricing decree and in September 2009, 
Colombian health organizations filed an “Acción Popular,” a mechanism under 
Article 88 of the Colombian Constitution to protect collective rights, public services 
and administrative morality.  (It is roughly analogous to a private attorney general 
action).55  The petitioners sought a compulsory license to stimulate competition.  In 
January 2010, the Colombian government announced a financial emergency in its 
health system and strengthened the powers of the medicines pricing commission. 
Only then did Abbott comply with the pricing order, reducing the price of the drug 
approximately 54-68%, an amount projected to save Colombia’s HIV programs 
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approximately US$12 million.56  
  
On February 29, 2012, Administrative Court 37 of Bogotá found that Abbott had 
violated the 2009 government pricing order for its HIV drug Kaletra and directed 
the Ministry of Health to initiate procedures for sanctions against Abbott 
(potentially including financial penalties).57  The Court determined that Abbott 
abused its dominant market position by pricing its essential medicine 350% higher 
in Colombia than in neighboring countries (about $3500 in the private sector 
compared to about $1000).  According to the Court, this fact harmed the 
sustainability of Colombia’s health system and violated “public administrative 
morality.” “Mercantile utility and patent ownership” the decision holds, do not 
justify “disobeying the national policy of price control for HIV/AIDS medicines.”58 
The ruling calls for maintaining Kaletra on a parallel importation list to ensure 
availability of the international reference price.59 
  
Only the state can issue price parameters and compulsory licenses, intervening in 
the market to ensure affordable drug purchases.  In this mode, the state has assumed 
an adversarial posture vis-à-vis a corporation, ostensibly in defense of human rights.  
Although the state has an interest in avoiding unnecessary conflict with firms doing 
business within its borders, it is readily apparent that governmental power can be 
applied differently than the naming, shaming and coalition building work of NGOs.  
Less clear is what is lost in the move from paradigmatic human rights claims 
asserted against the state to a world in which the state takes sides in a dispute 
between two non-state actors.60  
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Latin America has a well-developed human rights system.  Like its European 
counterpart, the Inter-American Court and Commission structure is statist in its 
orientation.  Despite obvious shortcomings, recourse to human rights litigation 
against the state has become an accepted norm.  It might be that horizontal advocacy 
against non-state actors, principally corporations, is more likely to occur in regions 
without a record of holding states accountable for a range of human rights 
violations.  After all, advocates sue where they have the greatest likelihood of 
success.  A competition tribunal case in South Africa (where there is no functioning 
regional court) or ATCA litigation in the United States (in a state that is not a party 
to the Inter-American Court) makes sense.  Viewed in this way, Latin America may 
be less likely to experience sideways advocacy because although serious abuses 
occur at the hands of non-state actors, such violations are generally committed with 
the tacit approval of state officials within a regional system that provides at least 
nominal relief against states.  This is particularly true within the Inter-American 
system where the Velazquez Rodriguez case imputes state responsibility in cases of 
forced disappearance, that is, it assigns legal duties to states for all kinds of conduct 
that occur on the territory.61 
 
Stories of the state as facilitator, partner and enforcer of human rights norms 
facilitate new ways of conceiving of human rights advocacy directed at parties other 
than the state.  At a minimum, the state no longer occupies the field exclusively, and 
it is more than a static wrongdoer.  In many circumstances, government can play an 
important role in preventing or responding to corporate human rights violations and 
the state can empower local and international human rights communities to assert 
                                                        




new forms of activism.  In other circumstances, non-state actors can inspire, provide 
cover for, or antagonize states into, progressive human rights policies.  The 
emerging importance of non-state actors does not replace either the power or the 
analytic focus of the state, but rather supplements it and poses challenges to 
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